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Despite significant evidence of ‘political budget cycles’ affecting public expenditure, studies 
of the impact of elections on tax collection have reached mixed conclusions. Drawing on 
significantly improved government revenue data, this paper finds, contrary to earlier 
research, that when we focus on all executive elections in developing countries there is no 
significant effect on levels of tax collection. Instead, the impact of elections on tax collection 
is conditional on elections being competitive, with competitive elections resulting in a 
negative impact on pre-election tax collection, split relatively evenly between direct and 
indirect taxes. The magnitude of the effect is large, reaching as much as 0.5 per cent of GDP 
in some specifications, and has important implications for understanding the incentive effects 
of elections and the connections between elections and effective governance. 
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There is a long-established research tradition exploring the effect of elections on short-term 
fiscal policymaking. Based on theories of opportunistic political budget cycles, these studies 
predict expanded public spending and reduced taxation in advance of elections, as 
opportunistic governments seek to secure political support among voters with short time 
horizons or limited information (Drazen 2001). Recent literature has, in turn, increasingly 
focused on the existence of conditional political budget cycles, with different institutional 
environments or electoral characteristics shaping political incentives in distinct ways (de 
Haan and Klomp 2013). These studies have increasingly focused on developing countries, 
where weaker institutions and less established democratic traditions predict greater scope for 
pre-election policy manipulation. 
 
While studies of political budget cycles are narrowly about the fiscal impact of elections, their 
importance lies at least equally in their ability to offer broader insights into the functioning of 
democracy. These studies offer direct evidence of whether elections lead political leaders to 
adopt short-term policy measures in an effort to secure political support. They thus inform 
broader debates about the potential downside of elections for economic management (Block 
2002). Of even greater interest, these studies can offer insights into how the political 
incentives generated by elections vary in response to institutional factors, or the particular 
characteristics of individual elections. For example, whether political budget cycles exist, or 
not, in diverse contexts can reveal differences in the incentives generated by different types 
of electoral systems (de Haan and Klomp 2013), or in the incentives generated by elections 
that vary in the extent of political competition or political freedom (Block et al. 2003; 
Efthyvoulou 2012; Aidt et al. 2011). The impact of elections on political incentives is 
notoriously difficult to study, making studies of political budget cycles a valuable source of 
insight into the broader development impact of elections (Chauvet and Collier 2009). 
 
Existing evidence suggests that political budget cycles are particularly pronounced in 
developing countries, where democratic institutions are often relatively weak. This research 
has highlighted the vulnerability of elections in weak democracies to short-term policy 
manipulation, while highlighting the potential short-term costs of elections for effective policy 
management (Brender and Drazen 2005; Block 2002; Block et al. 2003). However, existing 
research from developing countries has failed to exploit fully the insights to be found in 
studies of political budget cycles in two major respects. First, most studies have focused 
primarily on the expenditure side of the budget, while paying much less attention to tax 
collection. Second, existing studies have failed to exploit fully what political budget cycles 
can reveal about the political incentives yielded by different types of elections – that is, for 
example, whether more competitive, or more ‘free and fair’, elections affect political 
incentives in fundamentally different ways than less contested elections. This paper seeks to 
fill these two gaps. 
 
While most existing studies have focused on the effect of elections on public expenditure, the 
effect on tax collection may be substantively more important and tell us more about the 
functioning of democracy in low-income countries. Short-term increases in public spending 
are relatively easily financed through borrowing, and in many (though not all) cases those 
spending increases can be curtailed following elections. By contrast, reductions in tax 
collection create the same fiscal deficit, but may be less visible to taxpayers and can only be 
achieved through either a difficult-to-reverse reduction in rates, or, more likely, through 
reducing the quality of tax enforcement. The latter risks the politicisation of national tax 
agencies, with potential consequences for long-term statebuilding. Precisely because the 
potential costs of undermining the revenue base are comparatively high, evidence that 
governments have reduced tax collection prior to elections may offer particularly significant 
insights into the political incentives generated by elections. Indeed, most studies that have 
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considered the impact of elections on both expenditure and revenue have found a significant 
effect on the former but no effect on the latter (e.g. Brender and Drazen 2005). However, 
Erhart (2013) has recently reported a negative and significant impact of elections on tax 
collection, thus prompting further investigation here. 
 
There is equally an opportunity to exploit more fully information about political budget cycles 
to understand better the political incentives generated by developing country elections. To 
date, studies in developing countries have largely focused on capturing the institutional 
contexts in which short-term fiscal manipulation is most likely. As expected, they have found 
that such manipulation (primarily on the expenditure side of the budget) is more common 
where elections are relatively new and the institutional environment comparatively weak 
(Brender and Drazen 2005; Block 2002; Erhart 2013). By contrast, they have largely failed to 
ask whether the characteristics of elections themselves – that is, how competitive or free and 
fair they are – affect the political incentives that elections generate. While both Block et al. 
(2003) and Chauvet and Collier (2009) explore this question to some extent, both adopt very 
minimalist definitions of electoral competition.1 They thus offer insights into the importance of 
multiparty competition and basic electoral freedoms, but do not tell us anything about 
whether political incentives differ substantially as multiparty elections become more ‘high 
quality’ or tightly contested.  
 
Against this background, this study employs markedly improved cross-country data on tax 
collection in developing countries – drawn from the newly-created International Centre for 
Tax and Development Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD) – in order to test the 
relationship between elections and tax collection in developing countries. Central to the 
paper is an effort to test systematically a wide range of alternative hypotheses about the 
impact of distinct types of elections: all elections, contested elections, free and fair elections, 
first elections in new democracies, transition elections resulting in a victory by the opposition, 
and, finally, competitive elections in which the opposition wins at least 40 per cent of seats in 
government.  
 
The results are strikingly clear-cut. There is no evidence that elections in general affect tax 
collection, nor that contested multiparty elections do so. There is similarly no consistent 
evidence that free and fair elections, first elections or transition elections have a significant 
effect on tax collection. However, there is consistent evidence that competitive elections 
have a significant and substantial negative impact on pre-electoral tax collection, amounting 
to an average of 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP. Strikingly, this effect grows stronger as 
the definition of competitiveness becomes more restrictive, while disappearing when 
adopting the type of minimalist definition of competitiveness adopted by Block et al. (2003) 
and Chauvet and Collier (2009). 
 
The importance of this finding lies in part in its immediate implications for policy 
management: elections can lead to pre-electoral reductions in tax collection, and there 
appears to be value in countervailing measures to mitigate this risk. However, the greater 
importance of the findings lies in what they tell us about elections in developing countries. It 
is a foundational feature of democratic theory that elections should have a larger effect on 
the political incentives of governments when they are competitive – it is only then that 
incumbent governments face a genuine threat of losing office (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). 
However, this intuition is difficult to test empirically (Gordon and Huber 2007), and the results 
presented here are among the clearest illustrations of the importance of electoral 
                                                 
1  Block et al. (2003) simply distinguish between single party elections (uncompetitive) and multiparty elections 
(competitive). Chauvet and Collier (2009) go further, focusing on a combination of basic electoral freedoms and 
opposition parties winning at least 25% of the vote. However, winning 25% of the vote is still far from constituting a 
significant electoral threat, and thus likely fails to capture a significant dimension of the concept of competitiveness. 
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competitiveness in shaping the political incentives generated by elections in developing 
countries.2  
 
Of course, the findings reported here focus specifically on short-term political incentives – 
and short-term reductions in tax collection resulting from greater electoral competitiveness 
are likely an undesirable outcome from a social perspective. However, the results have 
implications for broader studies of the development impact of elections. If competitive 
elections have a larger effect on short-term political incentives, the same is very likely to be 
true of long-term political incentives as well. Whereas most studies of the development 
impact of elections have focused on elections in general (e.g. Stasavage 2005; Harding and 
Stasavage 2014), the results here imply the need for more systematic attention to the role of 
electoral competitiveness in conditioning the effect of elections on political incentives and, by 
extension, development outcomes (Chauvet and Collier 2009).  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section provides a brief review of the literature. 
Section 2 specifies the hypotheses tested by the paper. Section 3 provides an overview of 
the data and variables used in the analysis. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, and 
Section 5 the key results. Section 6 presents robustness tests, Section 7 discusses the key 
findings and Section 8 concludes. 
 
 
1  Taxation and political budget cycles in 
developing countries 
 
Researchers have long been interested in the possibility that elections may lead 
governments to alter the pattern of pre-election expenditure and taxation in an effort to 
secure electoral support (Drazen 2001). The intuition behind opportunistic political budget 
cycles is straightforward: if voters are relatively short-sighted or have limited information, 
then short-term increases in public spending or decreases in tax collection could be effective 
strategies for increasing government popularity (Norhaus 1975; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; 
Persson and Tabellini 2002).  
 
While early research focused on the average effect of elections on fiscal variables, more 
recent research has turned attention to the possibility of ‘conditional political budget cycles’, 
with the existence or absence of political budget cycles dependent on particular features of 
the institutional environment, or particular features of different elections (de Haan and Klomp 
2013). This literature has stressed that many institutional factors expected to facilitate 
political budget cycles – including weak checks and balances and limited experience with 
democracy – are common to many developing countries, with corresponding evidence that 
political budget cycles are more significant in the developing world (de Haan and Klomp 
2013; Shi and Svensson 2006; Brender and Drazen 2005).  
 
While there is relatively extensive evidence of the existence of political budget cycles in 
developing countries, the vast majority of this research has focused on public expenditure or 
the overall size of the fiscal deficit. By contrast, the impact of elections on tax collection has 
more often been overlooked. This in part reflects greater ambiguity about the expected 
impact of elections on tax collection. On one hand, reductions in tax collection may be 
politically popular. On the other hand, decreases in tax collection may be less visible to 
taxpayers, may be more costly from the perspective of governments, and may necessitate 
corresponding decreases in public spending if there is a limit to the capacity of the 
                                                 
2  In developed countries Efthyvoulou (2012) and Aidt et al. (2011) have similarly found that political budget cycles are 
larger where elections are more competitive. 
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government to run fiscal deficits. Consistent with this story, much of the literature finds that 
political budget cycles in developing countries are driven overwhelmingly by changes in 
expenditure rather than changes in taxation (Block 2002; Brender and Drazen 2005; 
Schuknecht 2000).  
 
In a more recent study, however, Erhart (2013) focuses explicitly on the impact of elections 
on taxation, and reports two significant findings. First, she reports that elections as a group 
have a negative and significant effect on pre-election tax collection, amounting to about 0.2 
per cent of GDP. She suggests that this decline may in part result from formal policy 
changes, but is equally likely to result from politically-motivated laxity in enforcement. 
Second, and more novel, she finds that this impact varies by tax type, with elections having a 
negative impact only on indirect tax collection. She follows the logic of earlier work by Drazen 
and Eslava (2010) in attributing this pattern to the fact that indirect taxes have a much 
broader incidence than direct taxes, and are thus expected to benefit a much broader group 
of potential voters. 
 
However, there are reasons to question the theoretical basis for this focus on indirect taxes. 
This focus implicitly assumes that taxpayers are aware of their tax liabilities, and that political 
leaders seek to secure political support through direct policy appeals to a broad base of 
potential voters. Both assumptions may not hold in many developing countries. Political 
systems are often heavily patronage-based, relying on the ability of governments to deliver 
comparatively targeted benefits to politically influential individuals and groups (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson 2007). Meanwhile, direct taxes are frequently more visible and politically salient 
than indirect taxes, with many taxpayers only weakly aware of the extent of the indirect tax 
burden (Bird and Zolt 2005; Prichard 2010).3 For both reasons, rational governments may in 
fact target short-term reductions in the collection of direct taxes as they may be more 
immediately visible to taxpayers, while garnering the support of politically-important actors. 
By contrast, reductions in indirect taxes may be viewed as inefficient owing to their lack of 
visibility, and the fact that they do not correspond to the logic of patronage-based electoral 
strategies. 
 
More widely explored in the literature is the possibility that the extent of political budget 
cycles may be conditional on particular features of the institutional environment, or of 
elections themselves (de Hann and Klomp 2013). Block et al. (2003) propose that political 
budget cycles will be more significant where elections are more competitive, as electoral 
competitiveness should increase pressure on incumbent governments. They find that 
competitive elections have a negative impact on the overall fiscal balance. However, they 
define competitiveness very loosely, as the existence of multiparty competition. They make 
no reference to the extent of contestation – defined, for example, as the margin of electoral 
victory – while they do not focus on the impact on taxation in particular. 
 
Both Block et al. (2003) and Brender and Drazen (2005) consider the possibility that political 
budget cycles may be more pronounced in ‘new democracies’, though with mixed results. 
Brender and Drazen (2005) find larger pre-electoral increases in public expenditure in new 
democracies, which they define to include the first four elections after a democratic transition. 
However, they find an insignificant effect on tax collection. Block et al. (2003) focus more 
narrowly on first or ‘founding’ elections, but do not consistently find a distinct effect of first 
elections on the fiscal balance. Finally, Erhart (2013) and others consider the possibility that 
                                                 
3  While the tax literature has tended to argue that indirect taxes are less visible than direct taxes, this is not, of course, 
universal and has been challenged elsewhere, as sales taxes and value added tax (VAT) can become heavily 
politicised (Martin and Gabay 2007). This has sometimes been the case in developing countries, when the introduction 
of VAT has resulted in substantial protests (see, for example, Osei 2000). Thus, the introduction of VAT – and 
occasionally changes in rates – certainly can make indirect taxes comparatively visible (Prichard 2010). However, an 
important part of pre-election declines in tax collection is expected to result not from permanent policy changes but from 
short- term changes in the effectiveness of enforcement, and these changes are likely to be relatively invisible to 
taxpayers. 
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political budget cycles may be more pronounced where the ‘quality’ of elections is low, as 
this is expected to reflect institutional weakness. Consistent with this view, Erhart (2013) 
reports evidence that the negative impact of elections on taxation is larger where the quality 
of democracy is lower (as measured by the Polity IV dataset developed by Marshall et al. 
(2012)).4 
 
Alongside these possibilities, the broader literature on tax compliance suggests a further, 
unexplored, possibility: tax collection may decline more rapidly prior to elections in which the 
incumbent is relatively unpopular, owing to popular resistance to taxation. Here the intuition 
is not that the government chooses to reduce taxation in order to court public support, but 
that more unpopular governments are unable to sustain tax revenue owing to increasingly 
aggressive tax evasion, tax avoidance and overt opposition to taxation. To illustrate, Prichard 
(2010) captures episodes from both Ghana and Kenya in the late 1990s in which the growing 
unpopularity of incumbent governments contributed to their inability to collect tax revenue 
prior to elections. In both cases the incumbent governments lost subsequent elections, while 
the newly-elected governments saw tax revenue increase substantially following elections as 
public support for taxation returned. 
 
 
2  Hypotheses 
 
The literature thus proposes a wide range of alternative hypotheses about the connections 
between elections and tax collection in developing countries, each of which carries with it 
broader assumptions and insights about the nature of the political incentives generated by 
elections. What follows seeks to test an encompassing set of possibilities, as follows. 
 
H1: Tax collection will be lower in election years, irrespective of the particular characteristics 
of individual elections.  
 
This is the most basic theory of political budget cycles, and is based on the implicit 
assumption that all elections will generate incentives for short-term policy adjustments largely 
irrespective of the existence of an organised opposition, the strength of electoral institutions, 
the age of a democracy or the extent of electoral competition. Erhart (2013) finds positive 
support for this contention in relation to taxation, as she pools all elections in her analysis 
and finds a negative and significant impact on tax collection. 
 
H2: The impact of elections on tax collection will be larger for contested multiparty elections.  
 
This hypothesis draws on the expectation that elections will only shape the political 
incentives of incumbent governments if there is a legal opposition against which the 
government must compete. Block et al. (2003) report evidence that multiparty elections do, in 
fact, produce larger political budget cycles in Africa, though they do not test whether this 
applies to taxation in particular. Brender and Drazen (2005: 1274) simply assume this 
relationship, and therefore exclude single party elections from their analysis, writing that, ‘In 
our view, if the political budget cycle reflects the manipulation of fiscal policy to improve an 




                                                 
4  In fact, she attributes her finding to the fact that political budget cycles are likely to be more pronounced in newer 
democracies, where voters have more limited information and less experience with elections. However, her variable 
does not explicitly test the age of a democracy but its quality, which is reflected in the discussion presented here. 
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H3: The impact of elections on tax collection will be more limited where the ‘quality’ of 
elections and democracy is high and/or where elections are more free and fair. 
 
This possibility reflects a belief that high quality or free and fair elections are indicative of 
more effective oversight by voters, stronger political institutions and correspondingly more 
limited scope for short-term policy manipulation. By contrast, low quality elections are likely 
to reflect weak oversight and institutions, and thus greater scope for incumbent governments 
to pursue short-term policy manipulation in search of electoral support. Erhart (2013) reports 
evidence that elections held in countries with weaker institutions of democracy, as measured 
by the Polity IV dataset, do, in fact, lead to larger political budget cycles. However, 
measuring the quality of democracy or elections is comparatively complex and open to 
alternative strategies, as discussed below. 
 
H4: The impact of elections on tax collection will be larger during ‘founding’ elections. 
 
This possibility reflects a similar logic to a focus on low quality elections: in countries 
transitioning to democracy voters may have less information and may be more heavily 
influenced by short-term policy manipulation, while institutional checks and balances on the 
incumbent government are expected to be more limited. Consistent with this view, Brender 
and Drazen (2005) report evidence of larger political budget cycles in new democracies, 
though limited to a sample of primarily higher-income countries, and limited to the 
expenditure side of the budget. Block et al. (2003) find no distinct impact of first elections on 
the existence and scope of political budget cycles. 
 
H5: The impact of elections on tax collection will be larger where elections are more 
competitive, as reflected in the share of electoral support secured by the opposition. 
 
It is a foundational feature of democratic theory that the impact of elections on political 
incentives will be greater where elections are more competitive. However, studies in 
developing countries have defined competitiveness extremely broadly, focusing on whether 
elections are contested by multiple parties (Block et al. 2003), but paying no attention to the 
margin of electoral victory – that is, to the extent to which the leading party faces a genuine 
electoral threat to its hold on power. By contrast, this study follows recent studies from 
Europe (Efthyvoulou 2012; Aidt et al. 2011) in asking whether political budget cycles are 
larger when the incumbent government faces a more substantive challenge to its hold on 
power, as measured by the opposition securing at least 40 per cent of seats in government, 
as discussed in greater detail below.  
 
H6: Tax collection will decline more rapidly prior to elections in which the incumbent is 
removed from power. 
 
Whereas the preceding hypotheses assume that governments choose to reduce tax 
collection prior to elections in order to court electoral support, this hypothesis explores the 
possibility that tax collection may instead decline as a result of popular resistance and 
expanded tax evasion and avoidance where the incumbent is particularly unpopular. While 
we are unable to measure the popularity of incumbent governments directly, a useful 
alternative is to focus attention on elections in which the incumbent is removed from office, 
based on the assumption that this removal from office is indicative of a lack of popularity.  
 
H7: Elections (whether all elections or a subset of elections) will disproportionately affect 
indirect taxes rather than direct taxes 
 
This hypothesis draws on Erhart (2013), who argues that governments will focus on pre-
election reductions in indirect taxes because they have a broader incidence than direct taxes, 
and are therefore expected to attract a larger number of voters. However, as noted above, 
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the prevalence of patronage politics in developing countries, coupled with the relative 
invisibility of indirect taxes, may argue against such a focus on indirect taxes. 
 
 
3  Data and variables  
 
In order to test these hypotheses, a key innovation of this paper lies in employing vastly 
improved government revenue data, thus addressing concerns that earlier results may be 
driven by highly incomplete and occasionally inaccurate data for developing countries 
(Prichard et al. 2014). The paper draws on the newly-created ICTD GRD, which provides 
improved data coverage and accuracy across developing countries. These improvements 
are described in detail in Prichard et al. (2014), but can be summarised in two key elements.  
 
First, the dataset achieves improved data coverage by combining mutually compatible data 
from multiple international sources. Whereas the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
suffers from extensive missing data, these gaps can frequently be filled using regional 
sources or by drawing on country-level IMF Article IV reports. While potentially problematic 
from a strictly methodological perspective, in practice the low quality of the IMF GFS has led 
even IMF researchers themselves to abandon the GFS in favour of combining data from 
multiple international and country-level sources (e.g. Benedek et al 2012; Keen and Mansour 
2009). What distinguishes the ICTD GRD is that this process has been more extensive and 
more careful than previous efforts, thus resulting in much more complete and accurate data. 
The end result is that whereas Erhart (2013) is able to include only fifty-six developing 
countries and a maximum of 1,238 country-year observations in her analysis, the new 
dataset allows the analysis here to include 1,870 observations across ninety-eight countries 
in the core results.5  
 
Second, the ICTD GRD improves data accuracy by consistently distinguishing between taxes 
on natural resources and non-resource taxes on domestic businesses and citizens. This 
makes it possible to examine the impact of elections exclusively on non-resource tax 
collection. This is, in turn, a critical analytical distinction: we expect elections to affect levels 
of tax collection from citizens; there is no clear reason to expect elections to be related to 
changes in the corporate taxation of resource firms.6 By contrast, this distinction is generally 
not drawn in existing international sources, which frequently combine resource and non-
resource tax revenue in a single measure of tax collection, with the risk of ‘contaminating’ the 
dependent variable of interest.  
 
Drawing on this data we are thus able to construct our three dependent variables of interest: 
total tax revenue collection as a share of GDP (tottax), total direct tax collection as a share of 
GDP (direct), and total indirect tax collection as a share of GDP (indirect). Following standard 
international classifications, direct taxes include taxes on corporations, income taxes on 
individuals, property taxes and payroll taxes, but exclude social contributions, which are both 
analytically distinct and reported inconsistently across countries. Indirect taxes include sales 
taxes (including VAT), excise taxes, trade taxes and other taxes. Each of these tax variables 
is exclusive of resource revenue. 
 
                                                 
5  This number excludes countries with a population less than 1 million and data for Zimbabwe, which is a major outlier 
owing to hyperinflation in the 2000s. Exclusion of the latter does not alter key results, but is analytically appropriate. 
6  Of course, a variety of accounts suggest that governments regularly provide reduced taxes to resource firms – 
particularly in the mining sector – in exchange for informal political contributions. However, there is no clear reason why 
such concessions should accelerate prior to elections, as any exchange of tax concessions for political contributions 
can occur at any point in the electoral cycle, and is likely to be negotiated at the point of establishing specific terms for 
new mining ventures (see, for example, Ayee et al. 2011: 21).  
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While the most notable improvements in data quality relate to the revenue variables, the 
paper is also able to draw on a growing number of electoral datasets in order to capture 
distinct types of elections more precisely, and thus explore whether political budget cycles 
are conditional on these characteristics. The primary source of electoral data is the National 
Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde and Marinov 2012), 
which provides key descriptive information on all elections worldwide, as well as 
systematically coding key information about the conduct of those elections. The primary 
limitation of the NELDA dataset is that it does not include information on election outcomes, 
thus preventing estimation of the intensity of electoral competition. It is thus supplemented 
with data on electoral outcomes from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), which 
provides the most complete cross-country information on the share of electoral support 
received by the government and opposition in individual elections (Beck et al. 2001). 
 
Drawing on these datasets, we construct variables capturing the distinct subsets of elections 
in which we are interested. To begin we construct a variable for all elections (election), which 
is a binary dummy variable coded 1 for years in which there is an election and 0 in years 
without an election. Following the literature the variable includes all executive elections, as 
coded by the NELDA dataset.7 We next construct a dummy variable for contested multiparty 
elections which include a legal opposition (election_opp).8 In order to explore the distinct 
effect of high quality or free and fair elections, we then construct a dummy variable that takes 
the value 0 if there is evidence of significant electoral irregularities, and 1 if the election was 
relatively free of concerns (election_free), again as coded in the NELDA dataset.9 Alternative 
definitions are explored in the robustness checks, while the core results are based on the 
NELDA dataset for the sake of consistency. In order to focus on the potentially unique effect 
of elections in new democracies, we follow Block et al. (2003) by constructing a dummy 
variable for first elections (election_first) that is equal to 1 for either the first-ever democratic 
election in a country or the first democratic election after a significant hiatus, again as coded 
in the NELDA dataset.10  
 
While the preceding variables largely follow the existing literature, the final two electoral 
variables are comparatively novel. In order to test whether tax collection declines more 
rapidly when the incumbent government is particularly unpopular, we create a dummy 
variable that is equal to 1 if the election results in a transition in power to the opposition 
(election_transition), as coded by the NELDA dataset.11 Finally, in order to test the distinct 
impact of competitive elections on tax collection, it is necessary to adopt a specific definition 
of competitiveness. We thus define a dummy variable for competitive elections 
(election_comp) that is equal to 1 if the government wins 60 per cent or less of all the seats 
                                                 
7  Executive elections are defined as elections in which the position of the effective head of state is contested, where the 
effective head of state may be an elected president, the leader of the largest party or coalition in parliament, or 
someone else.  
8  It is coded by excluding elections for which any of the variables nelda3, nelda4 or nelda 5 is coded ‘no’ (Hyde and 
Marinov 2012). 
9  Specifically, it excludes elections that involved boycotts by the opposition (variable: nelda 14), harassment of the 
opposition (nelda15), the cancellation of results favouring either the incumbent or the opposition (nelda 34 and nelda 
32), reports of fraud by election monitors (nelda47), or refusal to participate by electoral monitors owing to perceived 
electoral fraud (nelda49). 
10  An alternative option is to include multiple elections following the initial transition to democracy under the broader 
banner of new democracies, with de Haan and Klomp (2013: 392) offering an overview of different approaches in the 
literature. However, given the relatively recent adoption of democracy in many developing countries, such an approach 
ends up including a large share of all elections thus making a narrow focus on first elections more analytically useful 
here. 
11  That said, this may be an imperfect measure of the concept of interest: incumbents may be highly unpopular without 
losing elections when elections are not free and fair, while in well-established democracies regular democratic 
transitions occur without that being a reflection of outright hostility to the outgoing government. Unfortunately, no 
superior measure of popular hostility to incumbent governments is available.  
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in government, as coded by the DPI.12 In the robustness checks we then explore robustness 
to alternative definitions.  
 
There is, of course, substantial overlap between these different electoral measures. For 
example, higher quality elections are, all else being equal, intuitively also more likely to be 
competitive. Similarly, elections resulting in a victory by the opposition are more likely to have 
been competitive, and to have been high quality. These connections are illustrated in Table 
1. However, the more important message from the Table is that despite significant overlap 
each of the measures is also substantially distinct from the others, allowing for meaningful 
tests of competing hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 Correlations between alternative election measures 










Election_e5 1.000      
Election_e5_opp 0.9271 1.000     
Election_e5_free 0.7277 0.7850 1.000    
Election_e5_first 0.2832 0.3054 0.2325 1.000   
Election_e5_comp 0.5887 0.6350 0.6313 0.2508 1.000  
Election_e5_transition 0.6004 0.6477 0.6016 0.1392 0.5713 1.000 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
 
Alongside defining these subsets of elections, the literature has long recognised that the 
fiscal effect of an election may be felt in the year prior to the election rather than in the 
election year itself – and that this needs to be accounted for in the analysis (Erhart 2013; 
Brender and Drazen 2005). Electorally-motivated reductions in tax collection seem likely to 
begin from six to twelve months, or even more, prior to the election itself, meaning that when 
an election occurs early in the calendar year the fiscal effect of the election is more likely to 
be felt in the year prior.13 As importantly, for elections that occur early in the year focusing on 
the fiscal effect in the actual election year will primarily capture the post-election fiscal effect. 
As such, for elections that occur early in the calendar year the effective election year for 
detecting fiscal effects is the year prior to the actual election year, as follows: 
 
ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊_݁݇௜,௧ ൌ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ_ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧ାଵ					݂݅	݈݁݁ܿݐ݅݋݊_݉݋݊ݐ݄௜,௧ାଵ ൑ ݇   
																												ൌ ܣܿݐݑ݈ܽ_ܧ݈݁ܿݐ݅݋݊௜,௧									݋ݐ݄݁ݎݓ݅ݏ݁      [1] 
 
where election_ek is the effective election year for detecting the fiscal impact, actual_election 
is the actual election year and k takes a value 1 through 12 and captures the cut-off point for 
re-coding the effective election year, with elections earlier than month k expected to have a 
fiscal effect in the year prior to the election. Decisions about the appropriate value of k reflect 
assumptions about the relevant lag between the fiscal effect of an election and the election 
itself. Meanwhile, changes in the pattern of results as the value of k is adjusted will offer 
insights into the actual length of the average lag between the fiscal effect and the election 
itself. Existing studies generally adopt a value of k ranging from three to six months into the 
year. The core results here take a middle ground by setting k = 5, denoted as election_e5, 
                                                 
12  There are important debates in the literature about the most appropriate means to measure electoral competitiveness, 
and none are perfect (Hyde and Marinov 2012). To an important extent this reflects the fact that a large margin of 
electoral victory may reflect a lack of competition, or may reflect the success of an incumbent in satisfying public 
demands in the face of a potentially competitive challenge. It is equally possible that a large margin of electoral victory 
could disguise significant intra-party electoral competition (e.g. Giliomee and Simkins 1999). However, a focus on the 
margin of victory is both conceptually straightforward and captures the core logic of democratic theory, and for this 
reason is the approach also adopted elsewhere in the literature (Efthyvoulou 2012; Aidt et al. 2011). 
13  While not discussed in the literature, the lead time is intuitively potentially longer for tax reductions than changes in 
public expenditure, as tax benefits are more difficult to target and are constrained by the timing of tax payments 
throughout the fiscal year, thus making it more difficult to concentrate benefits immediately prior to an election. 
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thus looking for a fiscal effect in the year prior when elections occur in the first five months of 
the year. The impact of alternative coding decisions is explored in the robustness checks.  
 
Finally, the results that follow include a standard set of control variables drawn from the 
literature that are expected to influence levels of tax collection. The log level of per capita 
income (lgdp) captures the expectation that the tax share of GDP will be higher where 
incomes are higher. The share of agriculture in the national economy (agric) reflects the 
greater difficulty of taxing agricultural production. The level of imports (imports) is expected to 
have a positive impact on tax collection, by virtue of taxes explicitly on trade, as well as 
greater ease in taxing more formal economic transactions. The level of inflation (inflation) is 
expected to have a negative impact on the value of tax collection, while tax collection is 
expected to be higher when the growth rate per captita is higher (growthpc). All these 
variables are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. In addition, the 
regressions include two control variables that have often been overlooked in recent studies: 
the existence of a civil war (civil_war), constructed using data from the UCDP/PRIO dataset, 
which is expected to reduce tax collection, and the level of non-tax revenue as a share of 
GDP (totnontax), drawn from the ICTD GRD, which has been shown to lead to reduced tax 
effort (Bornhorst et al. 2008). Finally, following recent studies, the robustness checks also 
introduce controls for the level of urbanisation (urban), the share of the population under the 
age of 14 (under14), and the share of the population over the age of 65 (over65), all of which 
are taken from the WDI. 
 
 
4  Empirical strategy  
 
Following the literature we employ a dynamic estimation model of the form:  
 
Taxi,t = φ Taxi,t-l + β1 Election_e5i,t + X’i,t-1δ+ αi + λt + ei,t      [2] 
 
where the dependent variable, Tax, represents total tax revenue (tottax), direct tax revenue 
(direct) or indirect tax revenue (indirect) as shares of GDP, Election_e5 is our key 
independent variable, X represents the battery of control variables, α are the country fixed 
effects, λ are year fixed effects and e is the error term. The lagged dependent variable is 
included in order to account for the persistence of tax collection over time and any potential 
mean reverting dynamics. The analysis also includes fixed effects in order to focus on within-
country variation in tax collection in response to elections.  
 
However, the fixed effects estimator is biased when employed alongside a lagged dependent 
variable, as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term (Nickell 1981). As 
explained by Brender and Drazen (2005), the extent of this bias declines in the length of the 
time series and is likely to be relatively modest but non-negligible, given that our data covers 
three decades. The widely-used Arellano-Bond Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator is likely to be more accurate (Blundell and Bond 1998), and all results are thus 
reported employing both the fixed effects estimator and the Sys-GMM estimator, the latter of 
which employs both lagged first differences and lagged levels of the explanatory variables as 
instruments. The Sys-GMM results are computed using Windmeijer robust standard errors, 
while the relevant tables report tests for second order autocorrelation as well as the Hansen 
test for invalid instruments (Roodman 2006, 2009). 
 
In orde to explore the conditional impact of different types of elections the basic model is 
subsequently extended. To begin, we wish to explore the impact of focusing only on 
contested elections (election_e5_opp), as compared to focusing on all executive elections 
(election_e5). In order to do so, the model is extended to include two election variables: the 
baseline elections variable (election_e5) and the variable representing the more limited 
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subset of elections of interest (election_e5_opp), as follows:  
 
Taxi,t =  φTaxi,t-l + β1 Election_e5i,t + β2 Election_e5_oppi,t + X’i,t-1 δ+ αi + λt + ei,t   [3] 
 
Because contested elections are a subset of all elections, the interpretation of the results is 
similar to an interaction model. The coefficient β1 on the baseline elections term (election_e5) 
tells us the independent effect of elections that are not contested. The coefficient β2 on the 
subset of elections of interest (election_e5_opp) tells us whether that subset of elections 
(contested elections) is statistically significantly different from the baseline group of elections 
(uncontested elections). Finally, the overall effect of the subset of elections of interest – in 
this case contested elections – can be calculated as the linear combination of coefficients β1 
and β2, which is reported in all the Tables to follow. The value of this linear combination is 
essentially identical to the result if we run a simpler regression that includes only the subset 
of elections of interest, as follows: 
 
Taxi,t =  φTaxi,t-l + β1 Election_e5_oppi,t + X’i,t-1 δ+ αi + λt + ei,t     [4] 
 
The added value of also including the baseline elections term, as in [3], is that it allows us to 
test formally whether the subset of elections of interest is statistically significantly different 
from all other elections. Ultimately, we are looking for evidence both that a particular subset 
of elections is significantly different from all other elections, as captured by β2, and that the 
total effect of that subset of elections, as measured by the linear combination β1 + β2, is 
statistically significant. 
 
Having thus compared contested elections to all other elections we then proceed to test the 
distinct impact of all the other subsets of elections of interest: election_e5_free, 
election_e5_first, election_e5_transition and election_e5_comp. However, rather than 
comparing each subset of elections to all other elections (election_e5), we now use as the 
baseline all other contested elections (elections_e5_opp). While the results are robust to 
using all elections as the baseline, focusing exclusively on contested elections seems to be a 
more interesting and meaningful comparison.14 This gives us the following specification, 
where Electiontype_e5 represents each of the subsets of elections noted above: 
 
Taxi,t = φTaxi,t-l + β1Election_e5_oppi,t + β2 Electiontype_e5  + X’i,t-1 δ+ αi + λt + ei,t  [5] 
 
This allows us to test whether free, first, transition or competitive elections have a distinct 
impact on pre-election levels of tax collection, as well as the magnitude of this effect. 
 
 
5  Results 
 
Tables 2 and 3 present the core results, employing the fixed effects and Sys-GMM 
estimators in turn. Moving from left to right, each of the Tables reports results focusing, in 
turn, on all elections (election_e5), contested elections (election_e5_opp), free and fair 
elections (election_e5_free), first elections (election_e5_first), elections resulting in a 




                                                 
14  And, indeed, some studies entirely exclude unopposed elections from the sample from the outset (Brender and Drazen 
2005).  
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Table 2 Effect of different election types on tax revenue - fixed effects 














L.TotTax 0.7534*** 0.7535*** 0.7526*** 0.7532*** 0.7532*** 0.7533*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) 
election_e5 -0.0009 -0.0012     
 (0.0009) (0.0021)     
election_e5_opp  0.0003 -0.0027* -0.0008 0.0000 0.0006 
  (0.0022) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
election_e5_free   0.0029*    
   (0.0017)    
election_e5_first    -0.0014   
    (0.0030)   
election_e5_transition     -0.0024  
     (0.0017)  
election_e5_comp      -0.0033** 
      (0.0016) 
lgdp -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) 
Agric -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Imports 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Civil_War -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
TotNonTax -0.0266** -0.0266** -0.0266** -0.0268** -0.0270** -0.0266** 
 (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0113) 
Inflation 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.0000** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Growthpc 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
1 + 2  -.0009 .0001 (-.0021) -.0023* -.0027** 
  (.0010) (.0010) (.0029) (.0012) (.0012) 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 0.689 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results include fixed effects with robust standard 
errors. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections 




Table 3 Effect of different election types on tax revenue - Sys-GMM 














L.TotTax 0.7556*** 0.7513*** 0.7686*** 0.7567*** 0.7534*** 0.7536*** 
 (0.0556) (0.0605) (0.0730) (0.0665) (0.0645) (0.0562) 
election_e5 -0.0008 -0.0000     
 (0.0011) (0.0020)     
election_e5_opp  -0.0011 -0.0033** -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0010 
  (0.0023) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
election_e5_free   0.0032*    
   (0.0019)    
election_e5_first    -0.0018   
    (0.0033)   
election_e5_transition     -0.0016  
     (0.0021)  
election_e5_comp      -0.0049** 
      (0.0020) 
lgdp 0.0025 0.0024 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0023 
 (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0015) 
Agric -0.0002* -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002** -0.0002*** -0.0002** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Imports 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Civil_War -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0016 
 (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0018) 
TotNonTax -0.0649*** -0.0682*** -0.0649*** -0.0660*** -0.0691*** -0.0675*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0174) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0148) 
Inflation 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Growthpc 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002** 0.0002* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
1 + 2  -.0012 -.0001 -.0028 -.0021 -.0039** 
  (.0012) (.0014) (.0033) (.0016) (.0015) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.338 0.332 0.318 0.341 0.320 0.339 
Hansen 0.390 0.979 0.993 0.991 0.996 0.998 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM 
procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in 
row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. 
 
Across both estimation methods we fail to find a statistically significant negative effect of all 
elections on tax collection, with results reported in column 1. While the coefficients on the 
elections variable are always negative, they fall far short of statistical significance at 
conventional levels, while the magnitude of the coefficient is in any case small, amounting to 
only a 0.1 per cent of GDP decline in tax collection. This stands in contrast to Erhart (2013), 
who reports a negative and significant relationship with a magnitude of 0.2 per cent of GDP.  
 
The results in column 2 indicate that elections that are contested by an active opposition are 
no more likely than uncontested elections to result in a decline in tax collection. The overall 
impact of contested elections, in row β1 + β2, is virtually identical to the coefficient on all 
elections in Table 1, while the coefficient on election_e5_opp is insignificant and small in 




Column 3 focuses on free and fair elections. Across both the fixed effects and Sys-GMM 
models, the results indicate that free and fair elections are less likely to lead to reduced tax 
collection, while ‘unfree’ elections – that is, elections that experience electoral malfeasance – 
have a statistically significant negative impact on tax collection (indicated by the coefficient 
on election_e5_opp). The magnitude of this effect is relatively large, amounting to around 0.3 
per cent of GDP in both sets of estimates. This is consistent with political budget cycles 
being more likely in weak institutional environments that are home to opportunistic 
incumbents. However, robustness checks reported below suggest that this result is quite 
sensitive to particular definitions of what constitutes a free or unfree election. 
 
Column 4 focuses on whether political budget cycles are more substantial during first 
elections. Again the results here do not offer support for this contention: neither the 
coefficient on elections_e5_first, nor the overall impact of first elections in row β1 + β2, is 
significant in either the fixed effects or Sys-GMM estimates, despite comparatively large 
coefficients.  
 
Column 5 reports results when focusing exclusively on elections in which the incumbent 
government loses power and is replaced. The fixed effects estimates indicate that elections 
resulting in a transition have a statistically significant negative impact on tax collection (row 
β1 + β2). However, this result does not appear to be robust: none of the coefficients are 
significant in the Sys-GMM results, while even in the fixed effects results the coefficient on 
election_e5_transition is insignificant, indicating that transition elections are not statistically 
significantly different from all other contested elections. 
 
Column 6 reports results focusing on competitive elections, and there is strong and 
statistically significant support for the existence of a negative relationship between 
competitive elections and tax collection. In both the fixed effects and Sys-GMM results there 
is a statistically significant negative coefficient on election_e5_comp, signalling that 
competitive elections have a significantly more negative impact on tax collection than all 
other contested elections. Meanwhile, the overall impact of competitive elections (row β1 + β2) 
is in both cases negative and significant. The magnitude of the effect is substantial, with 
competitive elections estimated to lead to a 0.27 per cent of GDP decline in tax collection in 
the fixed effects estimates, and to a 0.39 per cent of GDP decline in the preferred Sys-GMM 
estimates. This result proves very robust to various checks reported below.  
 
Having considered the impact of various types of elections on total tax revenue, Table 4 
follows Erhart (2013) in presenting results in which the dependent tax variable is divided into 
its direct tax and indirect tax components. Results are again reported using both fixed effects 




Table 4 Effect of elections on direct and indirect tax revenue 

































FE Sys-GMM FE Sys-GMM 
L.Direct 0.7925*** 0.8229***   0.7919*** 0.8652***   
 (0.0337) (0.0642)   (0.0340) (0.0506)   
L.Indirect   0.6843*** 0.6945***   0.6843*** 0.7309*** 
   (0.0293) (0.0681)   (0.0292) (0.0621) 
election_e5 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0006     
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0009)     
election_e5
_comp 
    -0.0013* -0.0012* -0.0013* -0.0019** 
     (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
lgdp 0.0006 0.0009 -0.0027 0.0011 0.0006 0.0008 -0.0027 0.0007 
 (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0018) 
Agric -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Imports 0.0001*** 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0003* 0.0001*** 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0003* 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Civil_War 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0008 





-0.0147** -0.0112*** -0.0155 -0.0585*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0048) (0.0164) (0.0159) (0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0165) (0.0131) 
Inflation 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Growthpc 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
AR(1)  0.000  0.002  0.000  0.002 
AR(2)  0.712  0.276  0.572  0.272 
Hansen  0.448  0.271  0.728  0.810 
No. of obs. 1551 1551 1542 1542 1551 1551 1542 1542 
No. of 
countries 
96 96 95 95 96 96 95 95 
R2 0.692  0.538  0.692  0.538  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Elections variable in columns 1-4 is for all executive 
elections. Results in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) employ fixed effects, while results in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) are based on 
the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the 
null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation.  
 
Columns 1 through 4 mirror Erhart (2013) in reporting the impact of all elections on the two 
distinct components of tax revenue, and none of the results are statistically significant. This is 
unsurprising given that elections as a group similarly have no significant impact on total tax 
revenue. For a more meaningful test, Columns 5 through 8 explore whether competitive 
elections have a distinct impact on direct or indirect taxes. All the results are now significant, 
indicating that competitive elections have a significant and negative impact on both direct 
and indirect taxes, in relatively equal proportions. Contrary to Erhart (2013) there is no 
evidence that elections disproportionately affect indirect taxes. As discussed earlier, this is 
not necessarily surprising when the focus is on developing countries, as the role of 
patronage politics, coupled with the low visibility of indirect taxes, may frequently make 
reduced collection of direct taxes a useful electoral strategy despite their relatively narrow 
incidence. 
 
Finally, in interpreting the results a brief note is needed about the diagnostic statistics. In 
order for Sys-GMM results to be valid we should fail to reject the null of no second order 
autocorrelation, and the null of the Hansen test of invalid instruments. All the results 
comfortably fail to reject in both cases, as reported in the Tables. However, Roodman (2009) 
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warns that the Hansen test can be misleading in the presence of the excessive proliferation 
of instruments – something that is relatively likely with a long time series and multiple 
explanatory variables, as is the case here. Specifically, he warns that Hansen statistics that 
approach 1.000 can be evidence of the excessive proliferation of instruments, with 
corresponding results needing to be treated with caution. The Hansen statistics reported 
here frequently approach 1.000, and this would normally imply that the results should be 
treated with caution. However, in practice, though not reported here, all the key findings are 
robust to adopting more parsimonious specifications.15 Critically, in these cases the Hansen 
test statistics drop substantially while leaving the core results in place, thus alleviating any 
concern about the results being driven by invalid instruments. In turn, the fact that the results 
are not driven by invalid instruments motivates the inclusion of more complete specifications 
here despite the large Hansen test statistics.16 
 
 
6  Robustness checks 
 
The most striking and novel finding is the positive relationship between competitive elections 
and tax collection. However, measuring electoral competitiveness is inherently challenging. 
One element of this challenge is that the choice of a cut-off point in deciding what constitutes 
competitiveness is somewhat arbitrary. Whereas the core results classify an election as 
competitive if the winning coalition controls less than 60 per cent of seats, Table 5a reports 
results when the threshold for competitiveness is set to either 50 per cent 
(election_e5_comp50) or 70 per cent (election_e5_comp70) of seats.  
 
  
                                                 
15  Specifically, all results are also tested when employing only the subset of elections of interest as the explanatory 
variable, as follows (using competitive elections for illustration): Taxi,t = φ Taxi,t-l + β1 Election_e5_compi,t + X’i,t-1δ+ αi + λt 
+ ei,t. In all cases competitive elections have a negative effect on tax collection, and all other results are also 
unchanged. All results are also tested using a simplified calibration of the Sys-GMM model, with elections treated as 
exogenous rather than being treated as endogenous, and the results are similarly robust to this change, with 
substantially lower Hansen test statistics. 
16  All results available on request. 
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Table 5a Robustness checks: re-estimating results using alternative definitions of 
competitiveness 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Comp60 Comp60 Comp50 Comp50 Comp70 Comp70 
 FE Sys-GMM FE Sys-GMM FE Sys-GMM 
L.TotTax 0.7533*** 0.7536*** 0.7526*** 0.7895*** 0.7533*** 0.7641*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0562) (0.0184) (0.0610) (0.0184) (0.0512) 
election_e5_opp 0.0006 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0001 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0018) (0.0021) 
election_e5_comp -0.0033** -0.0049**     
 (0.0016) (0.0020)     
election_e5_comp50   -0.0042*** -0.0046**   
   (0.0016) (0.0018)   
election_e5_comp70     -0.0024 -0.0024 
     (0.0020) (0.0024) 
1 + 2 -.0027** -.0038** -.0041*** -.0049*** -.0018 -.0025* 
 (.0012) (.0015) (.0014) (.0014) (0.0011) (.0013) 
AR(1)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)  0.339  0.312  0.344 
Hansen  0.998  0.999  0.970 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 
R2 0.689  0.689  0.689  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Elections variable in columns 1-4 is for all executive 
elections. Results in columns (1), (3), and (5) employ fixed effects, while results in columns (2), (4) and (6) are based on the 
two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the 
null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 
2. Estimates all include the standard set of controls – lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc - though 
not reported here to conserve space. Comp60 denotes that the government controls less than 60% of seats in government, 
Comp50 denotes less than 50%, Comp70 denotes less than 70%. 
 
The results are not only consistent with the argument so far, but add additional support. 
When the cut-off point for competitiveness is lowered to 50 per cent of seats, thus insisting 
on a still greater degree of competitiveness than the earlier results, we would expect an even 
larger effect. Consistent with this expectation, the magnitude of the effect of competitive 
elections (reported in columns 3 and 4) remains significant in both fixed effects and Sys-
GMM estimates, while the magnitude of the effect increases by greater than 25 per cent - to 
almost 0.5 per cent of GDP (reported in row β1 + β2). Meanwhile, when the threshold for 
competitiveness is increased – thus including a set of elections in which the opposition poses 
at best a marginal threat – we expect the coefficient on competitive elections to decline. 
Again, this is precisely what we find, as most of the relevant coefficients become 
insignificant. Only the overall effect of competitive elections remains negative and significant 
in the Sys-GMM estimates, but even there the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced by half 
relative to when the threshold for competitiveness is set at 50 per cent of seats. 
 
Results reported in Table 5b consider additional potential challenges in measuring 
competitiveness. One possibility is that incumbent governments may find it difficult in a 
vacuum to predict the competitiveness of upcoming elections, given the frequent absence of 
the types of polling data available in more developed states. In this context governments may 
rely on the competitiveness of previous elections to inform their expectations. To test this 
possibility, columns 3 and 4 report results when elections are coded as competitive when the 
government controls less than 60 per cent of seats in government prior to the election 
(election_e5_comp_past). Alternatively, reliance on the number of seats in government to 
measure competitiveness may be less accurate than relying on the overall share of the vote 
received by the government. Columns 5 and 6 correspondingly re-test the initial results when 
employing vote share rather than the share of seats in establishing whether an election is 
competitive (election_e5_comp_vote). In both cases the results are robust to these 
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alternatives, with the significant coefficient on election_e5_comp_past seemingly attributable 
in part to the fact that governments use information on past elections to gauge the likely 
competitiveness of future elections, but also in large part to the fact that a country that 
experiences one competitive election is likely to experience others in the future.17 
 
Table 5b Robustness checks: re-estimating key results with alternative measures of 
competitiveness 













L.TotTax 0.7533*** 0.7536*** 0.7533*** 0.7525*** 0.7530*** 0.8419*** 
 (0.0184) (0.0562) (0.0185) (0.0652) (0.0183) (0.0464) 
election_e5_opp 0.0006 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 
 (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0015) 
election_e5_comp -0.0033** -0.0049**     
 (0.0016) (0.0020)     
election_e5_comp_past   -0.0040** -0.0054***   
   (0.0016) (0.0018)   
election_e5_comp_vote     -0.0029* -0.0039* 
     (0.0017) (0.0021) 
1 + 2 -.0027** -.0039** -.0034** -.0047*** -.0028** -.0044** 
 (.0011) (.0015) (.0013) (.0017) (.0013) (.0018) 
AR(1)  0.000  0.000  0.000 
AR(2)  0.339  0.355  0.359 
Hansen  0.998  0.999  0.994 
N 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 
N_g 98 98 98 98 98 98 
r2 0.689  0.689  0.689  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Elections variable in columns 1-4 is for all executive 
elections. Results in columns (1), (3), and (5) employ fixed effects, while results in columns (2), (4) and (6) are based on the 
two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the 
null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. 
The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 
2. Estimates all include the standard set of controls – lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc - though 
not reported here to conserve space. Comp_past denotes that the government controlled less than 60% of seats in government 
prior to the election, Comp_vote denotes the government winning less than 60% of total votes in legislative elections. 
 
While the significant impact of competitive elections is the most important and consistent 
finding, the core results also provide support for the existence of political budget cycles in 
elections that are not free and fair, apparently reflecting the greater scope for pre-election 
fiscal manipulation where institutions are weak. However, defining free and fair is both 
complex and somewhat subjective, and Table 6 correspondingly reports results when 
employing alternative measures of free and fair. Results are reported employing Sys-GMM 
only, to conserve space, though all results are consistent when employing fixed effects.  
 
  
                                                 
17  The correlation coefficient between election_e5_comp and election_e5_comp_past is 0.7039. 
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Table 6 Robustness checks: re-estimating ‘free and fair’ results with alternative 
election datasets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Free and 
fair 




 Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM 
L.TotTax 0.7839*** 0.7291*** 0.7863*** 0.7594*** 0.6973*** 0.7016*** 
 (0.0644) (0.0699) (0.0589) (0.0619) (0.0847) (0.0795) 
election_e5_opp -0.0009 -0.0034** -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0010 -0.0006 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0029) 
election_e5_ff 0.0006      
 (0.0026)      
election_e5_fof  0.0031     
  (0.0020)     
election_e5_polity70   -0.0009    
   (0.0022)    
election_e5_nofraud_dpi    -0.0000   
    (0.0026)   
election_e5_qedgood     -0.0001  
     (0.0022)  
election_e5_qedok      -0.0006 
      (0.0030) 
1 + 2 -.0003 -.0003 -.0021 -.0013 -.0010 -.0012 
 (.0022) (.0016) (.0013) (.0011) (.0015) (.0014) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.331 0.322 0.344 0.333 0.916 0.885 
Hansen 0.982 0.974 0.976 0.995 0.917 0.666 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1400 1400 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM 
procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in 
row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Estimates all 
include the standard set of controls – lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc - though not reported here 
to conserve space. 
 
Columns 1 reports results where elections are coded free and fair based on the database of 
free and fair elections developed by Bishop and Hoeffler (2014), with the elections variable 
(election_e5_ff) coded 1 for elections that are classified as both free and fair. Column 2 
employs a looser definition, with the elections variable (election_e5_fof) coded 1 if the 
election is coded either free or fair by Bishop and Hoeffler (2014). Most of the coefficients are 
insignificant. However, the results in column 2 indicate that elections that are neither free nor 
fair (captured by the coefficient on election_e5_opp) have a negative and statistically 
significant impact on pre-election tax collection, amounting to more than 0.3 per cent of GDP.  
 
However, subsequent columns suggest that this finding is quite sensitive to coding choices, 
and should be treated with caution. Column 3 focuses on high quality elections by coding the 
elections variable (election_e5_polity70) 1 where the polity score in the country (drawn from 
the Polity IV database. at the time of the election is above a 4 (on a scale of -10 to 10). 
Column 4 reports results when the elections variable (election_e5_nofraud) is coded 1 for 
elections in which there was no electoral fraud sufficient to affect electoral results, as coded 
by the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Column 5 captures results when 
the elections variable (election_e5_qedgood) is coded 1 for elections that are coded 
acceptable in the Quality of Elections Database (QED) developed by Kelley and Kolev 
(2010); while column 6 reports results employing a slightly looser definition, with the elections 
variable (election_e5_qedok) coded 1 for elections that are coded acceptable or ambiguous 
in the QED. The results in columns 3 through 6 are universally insignificant, with inconsistent 
signs, indicating that any relationship between the extent to which an election was free and 
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fair and the extent of political budget cycles is extremely sensitive to coding decisions, and 
thus not terribly robust. 
 
Beyond considering alternative electoral measures, all the findings are subjected to a series 
of overarching robustness tests. Though nor reported here in order to conserve space, all 
results are tested for alternative sets of control variables, including the addition of new 
controls for the share of the population under the age of fourteen, the share of the population 
over the age of sixty-five and the level of urbanisation, each of which appears elsewhere in 
the literature. The statistically significant results for competitive elections are completely 
unchanged by adding these new variables, in either fixed effects or Sys-GMM specifications. 
 
All of the results are also replicated employing data exclusively at the central government 
level – whereas the core analysis employs the preferred ICTD dataset, which includes 
general government data where relevant for federal states (see description in Prichard et al. 
2014). Conceptually, it is ambiguous whether it is more appropriate to employ central or 
general government data. The elections that are the explanatory variable in the analysis are 
at the central government level, which may argue for focusing only on central government tax 
collection. On the other hand, central government elections are often accompanied by sub-
national elections, while in any case the central government is likely to be able also to 
influence collection at the state/provincial or local government levels, and a failure to 
consider general government tax collection may obscure effects that occur at that level. In 
practice, the effect of competitive elections remains significant and of similar magnitude 
when relying exclusively on central government data, while all the other results also remain 
unchanged, thus further reinforcing confidence in the results (Table 7). 
 
Table 7 Robustness checks: re-estimating results using only central government 
revenue data  













 Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM 
L.tottax_cen 0.7060*** 0.6396*** 0.6513*** 0.6597*** 0.7168*** 0.7240*** 
 (0.0576) (0.0738) (0.0743) (0.0617) (0.0728) (0.0790) 
election_e5 -0.0010 -0.0024     
 (0.0010) (0.0031)     
election_e5_opp  0.0013 -0.0026* -0.0012 -0.0011 0.0005 
  (0.0033) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0015) 
election_e5_free   0.0024    
   (0.0019)    
election_e5_first    -0.0020   
    (0.0035)   
election_e5_transition     -0.0010  
     (0.0019)  
election_e5_comp      -0.0035* 
      (0.0020) 
1 + 2  -.0011 -.0002 -.0032 -.0021 -.0030** 
  (.0012) (.0014) (.0035) (.0018) (.0014) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.411 0.420 0.416 0.396 0.402 0.401 
Hansen 0.435 0.990 0.999 0.983 0.998 0.999 
No. of obs. 1793 1793 1793 1793 1793 1793 
No. of countries 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM 
procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in 
row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Estimates all 
include the standard set of controls – lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc - though not reported here 
to conserve space. 
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Results are similarly replicated using alternative samples of countries, with Tables A1 
through A4 in the Appendix reporting core results for, in turn: all countries, all non-resource 
dependent countries, all non-resource dependent developing countries and low-income 
countries exclusively. The results are all broadly consistent with those reported so far. When 
developed countries are included in the sample (Tables A1 and A2), competitive elections 
continue to have a statistically significant negative impact on tax collection, and are 
statistically significantly different from all other elections. However, the magnitude of the 
effect declines somewhat, which is what we would expect given previous research findings 
that political budget cycles are less pronounced (or non-existent) in OECD countries (de 
Haan and Klomp 2013). When we focus exclusively on developing countries, but now 
exclude major natural resource producers (Table A3), the results are almost identical to 
those for all developing countries, removing any concern that fiscal dynamics in resource 
states may be shaping the results. The only non-conforming result comes when we focus 
exclusively on low and lower middle-income countries, as in this case the impact of 
competitive elections becomes insignificant. However, this result does not appear to be 
fundamentally at odds with the results so far: the coefficient is still negative, and the 
magnitude comparable to earlier results, with the loss of significance reflecting larger 
standard errors with a much reduced sample size.  
 
The analysis is also replicated employing alternative definitions of the effective election year. 
As described above, in the core results we look for the fiscal effect of elections in the year 
prior to elections if the election occurs in the first five months of a given year. However, this 
cut-off point is somewhat arbitrary, reflecting a best guess about how long prior to an election 
the fiscal effect of that election is likely to be felt. Tables A5 through A8 in the Appendix 
correspondingly report results when either (a) we look for the fiscal effect of an election 
strictly in the year in which it occurred (election_e0), or (b) elections are recoded to the 
previous years if they occurred in the first three (election_e3), four (election_e4) or six 
(election_e6) months of the year, respectively.  
 
If our results are robust then we should not necessarily find that they are unchanged across 
these alternatives. Instead, their significance should decline when employing election_e0. 
For elections that occur early in the year the results employing election_e0 are capturing 
primarily post-election patterns of tax collection, rather than the pre-election effect on tax 
collection on which we are focused. As importantly, employing the election_e0 variable 
implies ignoring any fiscal effect of elections that occurs in the year prior to the election – a 
particularly problematic oversight for elections that occur early in the year. Meanwhile, 
expectations about the results using the election variables election_e3, election_e4 and 
election_e6 are more ambiguous, as they depend entirely on how far in advance of elections 
any fiscal effect takes place. As such, the pattern of significance is expected to provide 
insight into the time period over which elections tend to affect tax collection – with, for 
example, stronger results for election_e6 implying that the fiscal effect of elections occurs 
well in advance of the elections themselves. 
 
Again the results adhere closely to expectation, reinforcing confidence in the findings. As 
expected, the impact of competitive elections – and of all other types of elections – drops 
sharply when we employ election_e0, reported in Table A5. Tellingly, the impact of transition 
elections (election_e0_transition) is now positive, consistent with the replacement of an 
unpopular incumbent resulting in large post-election improvements in tax collection. Turning 
to Tables A6 through A8 the results for competitive elections follow a consistent pattern: the 
impact of competitive elections is negative, but insignificant, when employing election_e3 
(Table A8); negative, significant and large in magnitude when employing election_e4 (Table 
A7) and election_e5 (Table 3); remains negative and significant, but with a slightly lower 
magnitude, when employing election_e6 (Table A6); and is again insignificant when 
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employing election_e7.18 This pattern is summarised in Table 8. The fact that the results 
become stronger as the lag initially grows longer is consistent with the effect of elections on 
tax collection occurring well in advance of those elections. Meanwhile, the fact that the effect 
eventually begins to dissipate as the implied lag grows too long captures the fact that 
focusing on the year prior to elections eventually fails to capture effects that occur more 
immediately prior to elections.  
 
Table 8 Robustness checks: effect of competitive elections using different definitions 
of ‘effective’ election year 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












L.TotTax 0.7599*** 0.7815*** 0.7692*** 0.7536*** 0.7928*** 0 .7664*** 
 (0.0608) (0.0611) (0.0583) (0.0562) (0.0605) (0.0475) 
election_ek_opp 0.0004 -0.0006 0.0010 0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0015 
 (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0016) 
election_e0_comp -0.0008      
 (0.0021)      
election_e3_comp  -0.0012     
  (0.0019)     
election_e4_comp   -0.0051***    
   (0.0018)    
election_e5_comp    -0.0049**   
    (0.0020)   
election_e6_comp     -0.0031  
     (0.0022)  
election_e7_comp      -0.0002 
      (0.0020) 
1 + 2 -.0004 -.0018 -.0041*** -.0038** -.0035** -.0017 
 (.0011) (.0014) (.0013) (.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011) 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.360 0.349 0.327 0.339 0.326 0.342 
Hansen 0.953 0.954 0.999 0.998 0.988 0.999 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM 
procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that 
instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in 
row 1 + 2 capture the total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Estimates all 
include the standard set of controls – lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc - though not reported here 
to conserve space. 
 
Finally, the results in Tables A1 through A8 serve to reinforce scepticism about the other 
hypotheses tested in the paper. Across all the alternative samples of countries and 
definitions of the election year, there is not a single specification in which all elections, 
contested elections or first elections have a statistically significant negative impact on tax 
collection – though the coefficient on first elections is always relatively large in magnitude. In 
the specification focusing exclusively on low-income countries there is evidence that unfree 
elections have a negative effect on tax collection, at the 10 per cent level of statistical 
significance. However, this result does not hold for other subsets of countries and, though 
not reported here, is similarly not robust to the adoption of more parsimonious specifications 
or the adoption of a fixed effects specification, implying the need for caution. In several 
specifications the overall effect of transition elections (row β1 + β2) is similarly negative and 
significant. However, this result is again relatively fragile: in none of the specifications is the 
coefficient on election_ek_transition significant, while the result is highly variable in response 
to changes in the definition of the effective election year. Lastly, there is no clear pattern in 
the distribution of the effect of competitive elections between direct and indirect taxes. In two 
                                                 
18  Results available on request from the author. 
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instances – for election_e4_comp and for non-resource developing countries – the effect on 
indirect taxes is negative and significant, while the effect on direct taxes is not. However, in 
the vast majority of specifications the effect on direct and indirect taxes is either both 




7  Discussion 
 
The starting point for this paper was a concern that earlier studies of the impact of elections 
on tax collection were plagued by problematic data, which may have resulted in misleading 
results. As has been widely noted elsewhere, econometric research in the social sciences 
has frequently valued methodological innovation over careful attention to data quality 
(Herrera and Kapur 2007; Jerven 2013). Consistent with this starting point, the results here 
partially contradict recent results reported by Erhart (2013). First, there is no consistent and 
statistically significant evidence that elections in general have led to reduced tax collection in 
election years. This is true both when focusing on all elections, and when focusing more 
narrowly on contested multiparty elections. Second, there is no consistent evidence that 
elections have disproportionately affected indirect taxes. From the vantage point of theory, 
neither of these findings is necessarily surprising. There are clear reasons why tax collection 
may be less affected by political budget cycles than public spending, given lower visibility, 
higher costs and the fact that reduced collection may also imply reduced spending. 
Meanwhile, in many developing countries the nature of patronage-based politics, coupled 
with the relative invisibility of indirect taxes, can account for governments targeting both 
direct and indirect taxes in advance of elections.  
 
The more important finding is of a substantial and robust impact of competitive elections on 
pre-election tax collection, amounting to anywhere from 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP 
depending on the specification. The consistency of this result across a range of robustness 
tests is, in turn, particularly compelling. The negative relationship becomes stronger as the 
definition of competitiveness becomes more restrictive, and weaker as the definition of 
competitiveness is relaxed, precisely in line with theoretical expectations. The pattern of 
results as we alter the definition of the effective election year is equally striking: the results 
grow stronger as the lag between fiscal effects and elections is increased to the levels 
predicted by theory, while the strength of the results subsequently declines as the lag 
becomes so long as to fail to capture the short-term fiscal effect of elections. The fact that the 
results vary systematically with changes in the definition of competitiveness and effective 
election year offers, somewhat counter-intuitively, much greater confidence in the robustness 
of the results than would be the case if the results were relatively invariant – or varied in 
unpredictable ways – across these changes. 
 
Block et al. (2003) have previously reported evidence that political budget cycles have 
become larger where elections have been competitive, but they define competitiveness 
simply as the existence of multiparty competition. The results here suggest that competition 
defined so minimally has had little impact on government behaviour, at least in relation to 
taxation. It is only when the opposition has been sufficient electorally to have a meaningful 
possibility of electoral victory that incumbent governments have been driven to offer tax 
reductions in an effort to secure electoral support. This distinction is intuitively attractive: from 
a rationalist perspective there is little reason why the existence of only a very weak 
opposition would compel a government to inflict harm on itself by willingly undermining its 
revenue base. It is only when its survival is in danger that a government is intuitively likely to 
take such a step, and this intuition is confirmed by the results. 
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The paper also tests several other hypotheses from the literature. While in every case it is 
possible to see hints of these relationships in the results, none of these other relationships 
appears robust. Transition elections have a significant negative effect on tax collection in 
many of the specifications – and the effect is stronger when assuming a longer lag between 
fiscal effects and the elections themselves.19 However, we never find clear evidence that 
transition elections are statistically significantly different from all other elections. In various 
specifications there is evidence that unfree elections have a larger negative impact on tax 
collection, consistent with the view that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is more likely in 
weak institutional environments. However, this result is variable across specifications, and 
highly dependent on how free and unfree elections are defined. Following the same logic, 
across virtually every specification the magnitude of the coefficient on first elections is 
substantially larger than for other elections. However, this effect never attains statistical 
significance at conventional levels. Finally, in two specifications there is evidence that 
elections disproportionately affect indirect taxes, but this does not hold true in the vast 
majority of cases. While the results here thus do not rule out these alternative hypotheses, 
they suggest that those relationships are at best relatively weak – while offering a reminder 
of the importance of high quality data, and detailed robustness testing.  
 
The finding that competitive elections have led to a substantial decline in pre-election 
taxation is in some ways more striking precisely because of the weakness of all the other, 
equally plausible, results. In turn, this finding has important policy implications. The 
magnitude of the effect is estimated at 0.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent of GDP, and for countries 
struggling to raise sufficient revenue to fund public services and reduce aid dependence, this 
is a not insignificant hidden cost of competitive elections. Potentially more important than the 
revenue directly foregone in election years, however, is the possibility that the politicisation of 
tax enforcement prior to elections may have lingering effects on the probity, autonomy and 
effectiveness of revenue agencies. An important part of the early literature on political budget 
cycles in developing countries was motivated by the question of whether there may be a 
tension between elections and economic policy management and reform (Block 2002). The 
results here are clearly consistent with the existence of such a short-term trade-off, and point 
to the importance of countervailing measures to mitigate the risks of pre-election policy 
distortions.  
 
Looking beyond the narrow realm of taxation, the results offer important insights into the 
ways that elections shape the incentives of political actors in developing countries – and, by 
extension, into the broader functioning of democracy. It is a foundational feature of 
democratic theory that elections should have a larger effect on political incentives when they 
are more competitive. However, in practice the importance of electoral competitiveness in 
developing countries has been relatively little studied, while many studies have continued to 
express some skepticism about whether elections of any kind are likely to have a significant 
impact on political incentives in low-income countries (e.g. van de Walle 2003). 
 
For the most part, recent studies of elections in developing countries have continued to ask 
how multiparty elections in general affect development outcomes, with limited or no explicit 
attention to the competitiveness of those elections (e.g. Stasavage 2005; Harding and 
Stasavage 2014). An exception is the work of Chauvet and Collier (2009), who argue that 
elections only have a positive accountability effect when they are reasonable competitive. 
However, even Chauvet and Collier (2009) adopt only a very limited definition of 
competitiveness, which focuses on basic electoral freedoms and the opposition securing at 
least 25 per cent of the vote. The measure of competitiveness adopted here requires much 
more substantive competition, and correspondingly suggests that the impact of elections on 
                                                 
19  The latter is as we would expect: transition elections are particularly likely to generate post-election tax increases (Bates 
1989; Ascher 1989), which is likely to obscure any negative relationship between elections and pre-election taxation 
when shorter lags are employed.  
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political incentives is shaped not only by having broadly free and fair elections, but by having 
effective electoral challengers. 
 
Of course, the results here focus on short-term pre-electoral incentives, and thus tell only a 
small part of any broader story about elections, electoral competitiveness and fiscal 
management. The results tell us unambiguously that competitive elections have a larger 
effect on short-term political incentives than do elections in general. In doing so they highlight 
the short-term cyclical costs associated with elections, and indicate that the short-term costs 
of elections are, perversely, greater when elections are more competitive. By contrast, the 
results do not say anything directly about long-term political incentives. However, it is only a 
small leap of reasoning to conclude that elections are equally likely to have a larger effect on 
long-term political incentives when they are competitive.  
 
With this in mind, Chauvet and Collier (2009) draw a useful distinction between the short-
term cyclical effect of elections and the effect of elections on long-term political incentives. 
Critically, they argue that elections may simultaneously produce short-term costs, but 
substantially larger long-term gains. They find that the long-term effect of elections is greater, 
and more positive, when elections are more competitive – though, as noted before, they use 
a more limited definition of electoral competitiveness. The results here are consistent with 
this argument, while employing a more precise measure of competitiveness. While 
highlighting that electoral competitiveness amplifes the (negative) short-term incentive effects 
of elections, it is a natural extension of the finding to expect that competitive elections may 
similarly amplify the (positive) long-term incentive effects of elections.  
 
Critically, this possibility is consistent with existing tax research. Timmons (2010) has found 
that over the long term democracy has a positive impact on tax collection. More precisely 
aligned with the findings here, Jibao and Prichard (2013) present evidence that in Sierra 
Leone local-level elections have both resulted in a short-term decline in local government tax 
collection and generated long-term incentives for revenue-enhancing tax reform – with the 
latter benefits larger where elections have been more competitive. The most interesting 
message from the results here thus lies not in the specific finding that competitive elections 
lead to short-term reductions in tax collection – though that finding is itself important – but in 
the implication that electoral competitiveness may more generally amplify the incentive effect 
associated with elections in developing countries. 
 
 
8  Conclusions 
 
The results presented here call into question the existence of unconditional political budget 
cycles in relation to taxation. Instead, they focus attention on the importance of electoral 
competitiveness as the key factor shaping whether elections impact pre-electoral tax 
collection. While this finding is highly intuitive, it is surprising novel: in a recent review of the 
literature on conditional budget cycles by de Haan and Klomp (2013), the role of electoral 
competitiveness goes almost unmentioned, beyond a brief footnote (footnote 3, p. 388). The 
most important studies to have produced evidence that the margin of electoral victory drives 
political budget cycles are Efthyvoulou’s (2012) study of the European Union and Aidt et al.’s 
(2011) study of Portuguese municipalities. As noted earlier, Block et al. (2003) and Chauvet 
and Collier (2009) explore the impact of electoral competitiveness on policy outcomes in 
developing countries, but both have relied on very limited measures of competitiveness. The 
results here thus suggest the importance of much greater attention to the incentive effects of 
electoral competitiveness in developing countries, both in relation to political budget cycles 




Table A1 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results including all countries  



























L.TotTax 0.8723*** 0.8851*** 0.8784*** 0.8905*** 0.9057*** 0.8993***     
 (0.0504) (0.0410) (0.0407) (0.0434) (0.0338) (0.0452)     
L.Direct       0.9144***  0.8811***  
       (0.0699)  (0.0635)  
L.Indirect        0.8058***  0.8373*** 
        (0.0476)  (0.0512) 
election_e5 -0.0009 -0.0017     0.0000 -0.0008   
 (0.0009) (0.0021)     (0.0005) (0.0005)   
election_e5_opp  0.0011 -0.0020 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0007     
  (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0011)     
election_e5_comp     -0.0020    -0.0010* -0.0012** 
     (0.0015)    (0.0006) (0.0006) 
election_e5_free   0.0014        
   (0.0020)        
election_e5_first    -0.0033       
    (0.0030)       
election_e5_transition      -0.0015     
      (0.0015)     
1 + 2  -.0007 -.0006 -.0036 -.0023*** -.0022**     
  (.0008) (.0008) (.0031) (.0008) (.0012)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.381 0.381 0.370 0.379 0.391 0.393 0.345 0.264 0.299 0.276 
Hansen 0.228 0.575 0.377 0.404 0.555 0.380 0.339 0.207 0.476 0.464 
No. of obs. 2664 2664 2664 2664 2664 2664 2335 2327 2335 2327 
No. of countries 139 139 139 139 139 139 137 136 137 136 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. “All countries” includes every country for which data is available. Control variables lgdp, agric, imports, 
civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc are included in all regressions, but not reported in order to conserve space.  
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Table A2 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results including all non-resource countries  



























L.TotTax 0.8824*** 0.8912*** 0.8831** 0.8926*** 0.9082*** 0.8676***     
 (0.0467) (0.0424) (0.3779) (0.0767) (0.0350) (0.0452)     
L.Direct       0.9213***  0.9079***  
       (0.0694)  (0.0733)  
L.Indirect        0.8464***  0.8679*** 
        (0.0436)  (0.0396) 
election_e5 -0.0011 -0.0026     -0.0002 -0.0009   
 (0.0009) (0.0025)     (0.0005) (0.0006)   
election_e5_opp  0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0010     
  (0.0026) (0.0344) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0011)     
election_e5_comp     -0.0012    -0.0012* -0.0012** 
     (0.0016)    (0.0006) (0.0006) 
election_e5_free   0.0023        
   (0.0327)        
election_e5_first    -0.0032       
    (0.0066)       
election_e5_transition      -0.0014     
      (0.0017)     
1 + 2  -.0012 -.0011 -.0040 -.0018** -.0023*     
  (.0008) (.0048) (.0062) (.0008) (.0012)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.339 0.341 0.390 0.332 0.348 0.344 0.510 0.247 0.434 0.258 
Hansen 0.109 0.489 0.338 0.481 0.530 0.362 0.227 0.195 0.356 0.581 
No. of obs. 2355 2355 2355 2355 2355 2355 2071 2061 2071 2061 
No. of countries 120 120 120 120 120 120 118 117 118 117 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Includes every country for which data is available except for major resource producers, which includes all the 
OPEC countries as well as countries that receive at least 15% of GDP in non-tax revenue. Control variables lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc are included in all 




Table A3 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results including all non-resource developing countries  



























L.TotTax 0.7308*** 0.7384*** 0.6756*** 0.6308*** 0.7290*** 0.7533***     
 (0.0594) (0.0879) (0.1084) (0.0918) (0.0696) (0.0756)     
L.Direct       0.8717***  0.9012***  
       (0.0615)  (0.0524)  
L.Indirect        0.7222***  0.7646*** 
        (0.0568)  (0.0665) 
election_e5 -0.0015 -0.0005     -0.0007 -0.0007   
 (0.0012) (0.0031)     (0.0006) (0.0010)   
election_e5_opp  -0.0012 -0.0027 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0014     
  (0.0035) (0.0023) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0014)     
election_e5_comp     -0.0036*    -0.0008 -0.0017* 
     (0.0021)    (0.0008) (0.0009) 
election_e5_free   0.0028        
   (0.0025)        
election_e5_first    -0.0042       
    (0.0034)       
election_e5_transition      -0.0008     
      (0.0019)     
1 + 2  -.0018 .0001 -.0050 -.0040** -.0022     
  (.0013) (.0015) (.0032) (.0017) .0015     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004 
AR(2) 0.305 0.293 0.324 0.287 0.300 0.286 0.955 0.260 0.876 0.253 
Hansen 0.609 0.998 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.850 0.750 0.940 0.992 
No. of obs. 1612 1612 1612 1612 1612 1612 1338 1327 1338 1327 
No. of countries 84 84 84 84 84 84 82 81 82 81 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Includes every developing country for which data is available except for major resource producers, which 
includes all the OPEC countries as well as countries that receive at least 15% of GDP in non-tax revenue. Control variables lgdp, agric, imports, civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc are 




Table A4 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results including all low-income countries  



























L.TotTax 0.5152*** 0.5938*** 0.5897*** 0.6182*** 0.5671*** 0.6000***     
 (0.1714) (0.1635) (0.1871) (0.1192) (0.1654) (0.1354)     
L.Direct       0.7449***  0.8230***  
       (0.1307)  (0.1374)  
L.Indirect        0.6533***  0.5655*** 
        (0.1427)  (0.0766) 
election_e5 -0.0000 -0.0016     -0.0001 -0.0008   
 (0.0013) (0.0031)     (0.0007) (0.0010)   
election_e5_opp  0.0006 -0.0032* -0.0008 0.0002 -0.0009     
  (0.0033) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0015)     
election_e5_comp     -0.0028    -0.0006 0.0004 
     (0.0028)    (0.0010) (0.0010) 
election_e5_free   0.0032        
   (0.0022)        
election_e5_first    -0.0043       
    (0.0037)       
election_e5_transition      -0.0004     
      (0.0021)     
1 + 2  -.0010 -.0000 -.0050 -.0026 -.0013     
  (.0011) (.0016) (.0035) (.0021) (.0015)     
AR(1) 0.017 0.008 0.015 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.016 0.000 0.029 
AR(2) 0.364 0.321 0.295 0.275 0.322 0.305 0.912 0.198 0.756 0.254 
Hansen 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000 
No. of obs. 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1001 991 1001 991 
No. of countries 62 62 62 62 62 62 61 60 61 60 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Low-income countries includes all countries classified by the World Bank in 2008 as low-income or lower 




Table A5 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results using same year definition of elections 



























L.TotTax 0.7481*** 0.7409*** 0.7886*** 0.6986*** 0.7599*** 0.7940***     
 (0.0552) (0.0517) (0.0493) (0.0770) (0.0608) (0.0552)     
L.Direct       0.8430***  0.8382***  
       (0.0610)  (0.0471)  
L.Indirect        0.6797***  0.7209*** 
        (0.0625)  (0.0599) 
election_e0 -0.0007 -0.0002     0.0000 -0.0008   
 (0.0011) (0.0019)     (0.0005) (0.0007)   
election_e0_opp  0.0001 -0.0022 -0.0005 0.0004 -0.0018     
  (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0018) (0.0013)     
election_e0_comp     -0.0008    0.0001 -0.0011 
     (0.0021)    (0.0005) (0.0009) 
election_e0_free   0.0032        
   (0.0022)        
election_e0_first    0.0003       
    (0.0029)       
election_e0_transition      0.0035*     
      (0.0021)     
1 + 2  -.0000 .0010 -.0002 -.0004 .0017     
  (.0012) (.0012) (.0030) (.0011) (.0018)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
AR(2) 0.343 0.375 0.340 0.373 0.360 0.359 0.650 0.275 0.650 0.278 
Hansen 0.428 0.982 0.993 0.983 0.953 0.971 0.609 0.920 0.498 0.849 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1551 1542 1551 1542 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 96 95 96 95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Effective election year coded as the calendar year in which the election occurred. Control variables lgdp, 





Table A6 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results using E6 definition of elections 



























L.TotTax 0.7437*** 0.7494*** 0.7695*** 0.7454*** 0.7928*** 0.7687***     
 (0.0506) (0.0633) (0.0651) (0.0534) (0.0605) (0.0566)     
L.Direct       0.8206***  0.8674***  
       (0.0616)  (0.0505)  
L.Indirect        0.7037***  0.7299*** 
        (0.0666)  (0.0649) 
election_e6 -0.0014 0.0002     -0.0008 -0.0005   
 (0.0010) (0.0018)     (0.0005) (0.0008)   
election_e6_opp  -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0018* -0.0004 -0.0009     
  (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0013)     
election_e6_comp     -0.0031    -0.0012* -0.0020** 
     (0.0022)    (0.0007) (0.0009) 
election_e6_free   0.0015        
   (0.0024)        
election_e6_first    -0.0014       
    (0.0031)       
election_e6_transition      -0.0023     
      (0.0020)     
1 + 2  -.0017 -.0015 -.0031 -.0035** -.0032**     
  (.0011) (.0012) (.0030) (0.0014) (0.0016)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002 
AR(2) 0.352 0.349 0.361 0.351 0.326 0.340 0.644 0.279 0.584 0.276 
Hansen 0.496 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.988 0.998 0.557 0.368 0.724 0.818 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1551 1542 1551 1542 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 96 95 96 95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Effective election year coded as the calendar year in which the election took place if the election occurred 
during the last six months of the year, and coded as the year prior to the calendar year of the election if it occurred during the first six months of the calendar year. Control variables lgdp, agric, 




Table A7 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results using E4 definition of elections 



























L.TotTax 0.7608*** 0.7435*** 0.7683*** 0.7928*** 0.7692*** 0.8066***     
 (0.0541) (0.0532) (0.0574) (0.0755) (0.0583) (0.0656)     
L.Direct       0.8352***  0.8524***  
       (0.0639)  (0.0588)  
L.Indirect        0.6726***  0.7423*** 
        (0.0702)  (0.0674) 
election_e4 -0.0015 -0.0006     -0.0004 -0.0008   
 (0.0010) (0.0020)     (0.0005) (0.0008)   
election_e4_opp  -0.0004 -0.0022 -0.0013 0.0010 -0.0028*     
  (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0015)     
election_e4_comp     -0.0051***    -0.0010 -0.0023** 
     (0.0018)    (0.0007) (0.0010) 
election_e4_free   0.0013        
   (0.0020)        
election_e4_first    0.0016       
    (0.0035)       
election_e4_transition      0.0021     
      (0.0019)     
1 + 2  -.0010 -.0009 .0003 -.0041*** -.0007     
  (0.0010) (.0012) (0.0035) (.0013) (.0014)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.325 0.323 0.347 0.328 0.327 0.323 0.699 0.276 0.624 0.2640.482 
Hansen 0.649 0.999 0.988 0.978 0.999 0.993 0.390 0.537 0.657  
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1551 1542 1551 1542 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 96 95 96 95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Effective election year coded as the calendar year in which the election took place if the election occurred 
during the last eight months of the year, and coded as the year prior to the calendar year if it occurred during the first four months of the calendar year. Control variables lgdp, agric, imports, 
civil_war, totnontax, inflation and growthpc are included in all regressions, but not reported in order to conserve space. 
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Table A8 Robustness checks: re-estimating key results using E3 definition of elections 



























L.TotTax 0.7538*** 0.7259*** 0.7901*** 0.7808*** 0.7815*** 0.7581***     
 (0.0547) (0.0712) (0.0639) (0.0643) (0.0611) (0.0595)     
L.Direct       0.8276***  0.8552***  
       (0.0619)  (0.0565)  
L.Indirect        0.6761***  0.7340*** 
        (0.0691)  (0.0625) 
election_e3 -0.0013 -0.0002     -0.0004 -0.0006   
 (0.0010) (0.0018)     (0.0005) (0.0007)   
election_e3_opp  -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0019     
  (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0014)     
election_e3_comp     -0.0012    -0.0005 -0.0015 
     (0.0019)    (0.0007) (0.0009) 
election_e3_free   0.0021        
   (0.0019)        
election_e3_first    0.0007       
    (0.0035)       
election_e3_transition      0.0023     
      (0.0018)     
1 + 2  -.0010 .0001 -.0006 -.0018 .0004     
  (.0011) (.0012) (.0035) (.0014) (.0014)     
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.001 
AR(2) 0.331 0.360 0.333 0.342 0.349 0.339 0.706 0.276 0.628 0.264 
Hansen 0.466 0.995 0.994 0.946 0.954 0.989 0.420 0.846 0.638 0.674 
No. of obs. 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1870 1551 1542 1551 1542 
No. of countries 98 98 98 98 98 98 96 95 96 95 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All results are based on the two-step System-GMM procedure with Windmeijer standard errors. The p-values reported for the 
Hansen statistic are for the null hypothesis that instruments are valid. The values reported for AR(2) are p-values for tests of second order autocorrelation. The coefficients in row 1 + 2 capture the 
total magnitude and significance of the impact of the subset of elections reflected in 2. Effective election year coded as the calendar year in which the election took place if the election occurred 
during the last nine months of the year, and coded as the year prior to the calendar year if it occurred during the first three months of the calendar year. Control variables lgdp, agric, imports, 
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